Social advertising exploits the interconnectivity of users in social networks to spread advertisement and generate user engagements. A lot of research has focused on how to select the best subset of users in a social network to maximize the number of engagements or the generated revenue of the advertisement. However, there is a lack of studies that consider the advertiser's value-per-engagement, i.e., how much an advertiser is maximally willing to pay for each engagement. Prior work on social advertising is based on the classical framework of influence maximization. In this paper, we propose a model where advertisers compete in an auction mechanism for the influential users within a social network. The auction mechanism can dynamically determine payments for advertisers based on their reported values. The main problem is to find auctions which incentivize advertisers to truthfully reveal their values, and also respect each advertiser's budget constraint. To tackle this problem, we propose a new truthful auction mechanism called TSA. Compared with existing approaches on real and synthetic datasets, TSA performs significantly better in terms of generated revenue.
INTRODUCTION
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The huge success of such networks has led to interest in the topic of social advertising. Social advertising has been studied recently [2, 5, 47] , where models have been investigated for advertisement on platforms on which promoted posts, or ads, can be propagated through the network. Such promoted posts can contain any kind of content with which a user can engage (e.g., by clicking on a link, watching a video, "liking" a post, etc.).
The key question of social advertising is how to assign advertisement to seeders, which are essentially nodes paid to spread the advertisement in the social network. This problem is commonly modelled as Influence Maximization (IM) [3, 6, 9, 15, 29, 36, 37] . Specifically, each party (e.g., the advertiser) has a fixed budget of how many seeders he/she can afford. The goal is to find a set of seeders that maximizes the influence given the budget constraint.
Auction mechanisms for social advertising have also been proposed. Borodin et al. [11] develop mechanisms in a competitive IM setting and prove that they are truthful, i.e., the advertisers are incentivized to truthfully report their budgets, for two or more competing advertisers under different assumptions. Singer [44] develops a mechanism for truthfully eliciting seeding cost from the seeders. However, existing works do not consider the advertiser's value-per-engagement, which is the maximum amount that an advertiser is willing to pay for each user engagement with their ad. The value-per-engagement is similar to the value-per-click in sponsored search models. Auctions which elicit the value-per-click from advertisers are successfully used in a multi-billion-dollar industry [20] . Neither Borodin et al. nor Singer consider the value-perengagement of an advertiser. As we argue in Section 3.2, neglecting the advertisers' values-per-engagement in the model can have a strong impact on the generated revenue. In Section 3.1, we discuss the importance of the advertiser's value-per-engagement in more detail.
Our goal in this paper is to study auction mechanisms which (1) consider the value-per-engagement of the bidders, (2) consider the budget of the bidders, (3) and are truthful. Truthful means that when eliciting the bids, which consist of how much an advertiser is willing to pay per engagement and the amount of the budget, no advertiser should have a benefit by lying about this information. Having a truthful auction can have a big impact on revenue, as we discuss in Section 3.5. In this paper, we introduced our own mechanism called Truthful Social Advertising (TSA). Conceptually, TSA is a truthful multi-unit auction (we are selling multiple seeders) with value (in the form of value-per-engagement) and budget constraints. Borgs et al. [10] introduced an auction for this kind of setting, which serves as a baseline. We call this baseline auction Borgs. As it turns out, Borgs is the only competitor in our setting, to the best of our knowledge. This gap in research can be explained by an impossibility result introduced in [10] , which drastically limits the design space for auctions in this setting.
In Section 3, we will further elaborate on the importance of truthfulness for the revenue, the importance of the value-perengagement, the role of the price of each seeder, and how our setting differs from previous work on social advertising.
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce a formal model for designing auction mechanisms in the setting of social advertising in the presence of budget constraints (Section 4). • We present a new auction mechanism specifically designed for social advertising (Section 5). • We prove the truthfulness of the baseline in this new setting as well as our own auction mechanism (Section 5.3). • We establish an upper bound on the loss of revenue for the social advertising platform and the seeders, resulting from enforcing truthfulness (Section 5.4). • We conduct experiments to empirically evaluate the revenue and runtime of the different mechanisms (Section 6).
RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss relevant work related to influence maximization, social advertising, and sponsored search auctions. Influence Maximization [3, 6, 9, 15, 29, 36, 37] aims at finding a subset of k most influential nodes in a network which maximizes the number of nodes which can be influenced by these k nodes. Originally, the problem was studied under the Independent Cascade (IC) model by [29] . In this model, each active node has one chance to activate each of its inactive neighboring nodes, with a certain probability. In contrast, in the Linear Threshold (LT) model, an inactive node becomes active if a certain fraction of its neighbors is also active. This threshold is different for each node and ranges between 0 and 1. In both models, an initial set of nodes is set to active to start the diffusion process over the network [29] . In [14] , a wave propagation model and a distance-based model for influence propagation is proposed. Both models can be reduced to the IC model, if there is no competition. To find the best initial number of active nodes for influence maximization, two state-of-the-art approaches are Reverse Influence Sampling (RIS) [9, 45] and Influence Maximization via Martingales (IMM) [45] . Efficient heuristics as well as approximation algorithms have been developed for IM [16, 17, 42, 46, 48, 50] . Subsequently, competitive IM, corresponding to products, opinions, etc. competing for adoption or attention, has been studied [12, 22, 35, 38] .
Based on the foundation of IM, social advertising investigates models for advertisement on social networks. In [47] , Tucker found that advertisement on Facebook is very effective due to its ability to uncover similarly responsive users. In [6] , Bakshy et al. investigated the influence of users on Twitter. Aslay et al. [2] study how to maximize the revenue when the seeders need to be financially compensated, whereas in [4] , they study seed allocations to advertisers that minimize the regret resulting from the allocation undershooting or overshooting advertiser budgets. In [25] , Goyal et al. studied a two-player game in which nodes in a social network adopt a product based on a switching function. A different direction is proposed in [39] , where discounts are offered to users adopting an advertised product. Following up on this work, IMAX query processing [32] reformulates the IM problem as a query processing problem.
The VCG mechanism has been successfully applied to sponsored search auctions [43] and auctions for structured data [26] . Unfortunately, the VCG mechanism can degenerate into a non-truthful mechanism if the mechanism fails to maximize social welfare [43] or budget constraints are introduced [10] . An alternative to the VCG mechanism, which is often used in sponsored search auctions, is the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism [20] . Unlike VCG, the GSP mechanism is not truthful for profit maximizers, but it is truthful for value maximizers [49] . In [7] , auctions with budget constraints for display ads on webpages have been studied. Cai et al. [13] modelled the bidding process during ad auctions as a reinforcement learning problem. Unlike our work, in both [7] and [13] , the budget constraints are expressed as a constraint on the total payment over some time period (a day, a month, a year), and are not part of the bid. In [33] , the prediction of click-through-rates for advertising in Twitter has been studied. Their work focuses on the sparsity of training signals and online updates. In [40] , McMahan et al. studied ad-click prediction for Google ads. In a different approach to computational advertising, the assignment of advertisement to users is modelled as a multi-armed bandit problem [34] .
Our contribution differs from the related work in that we study social advertising under budget constraints, which apply to a single auction round and not an entire ad campaign, and participation constraints, which are expressed in the form of value-per-engagement.
PRELIMINARIES
In the following, we will discuss some important concepts.
Payment and Value-per-Engagement
In our social advertising model, we use the concept of paymentper-engagement and value-per-engagement. The payment-perengagement is the amount of money an advertiser has to pay whenever a user engages with their ad. In contrast, the value-perengagement indicates how much an advertiser values an engagement, i.e., what is the maximum amount of money the advertiser is willing to pay for each engagement of a user with their ad. The value-per-engagement is an important piece of information required by the social network platform: for each individual advertiser, the payment-per-engagement cannot be larger than the value-perengagement, in order to obtain a market which is attractive for the advertisers. Naturally, the value-per-engagement depends on (1) the product which is advertised, (2) the action the advertiser hopes to achieve when the user engages with the ad (e.g., buying the product), and (3) the probability that this action will occur while a user is engaging with the ad.
The Seeders and Seeding Price
The seeding price is the amount of money to be paid to the seeder for engaging with the ad and spreading it to other users in the network, potentially creating more engagements. The seeders create a Technical Presentation WSDM '20, February 3-7, 2020, Houston, TX, USA cascading effect where the ad spreads across the social network. Different seeders have a different reach -this is the expected number of people influenced by the seeder and thus, engaging with the ad. Seeders are users willing to engage and spread the advertisement in exchange for a payment. This is in contrast to the non-seeders, which are engaging and spreading the advertisement because of the influence from the neighboring nodes. The seeders are required to bootstrap the spreading of the advertisement. In order to not overcharge or undercharge the advertisers, the payment to a seeder should take into account the advertiser's valueper-engagement. In the following example, we will illustrate how difficult it is for a seeder to set an appropriate payment without knowing what kind for advertiser will be assigned. Example 1. Let a and b be two advertisers with a value-perengagement of $1 and $5, respectively. Suppose that there is a seeder s who would yield 100 engagements for the ad of advertiser a and 200 engagements for the ad of advertiser b. Hence, the seeder is worth $100 for a but $1000 for b. In general, the seeder does not know in advance what advertisers (e.g., a or b) he/she will encounter. An advertiser will not participate in social advertising if the price to be paid divided by the respective number of engagements-this is the payment-per-engagement-is higher than the advertiser's value-per-engagement.
Suppose that seeder s sets a price of $1000. Then it can only serve as a seeder for advertisers b, because the payment-per-engagement for advertiser a is $1000/100 = $10, which is larger than $1. Alternatively, assume that s sets a price of $100. In this case, the payment-per-engagement is lower than the value-per-engagement for both advertisers and thus, s is suitable for both advertisers, a and b. However, s has a relative loss of revenue of $900, if advertiser b is assigned to s because it could have charged 10 times more. □ From the above example, we conclude that seeders are in a disadvantageous position when determining payments, since they do not have access to all advertisers' values-per-engagement and don't know, who will be assigned to them. Consequently, we propose that the social network platform-which elicits the value-perengagement from each advertiser-determines individual paymentper-engagement for each advertiser on behalf of the seeders instead of letting the seeders fix a payment, beforehand. The social network platform will pay the seeders based on the determined paymentsper-engagement and the resulting number of engagements.
Inapplicability of IM Models
As discussed in Section 3.2, it is better to let the social network platform determine a payment-per-engagement for each advertiser than letting the seeder fix a seeding price. This observation has a direct consequence for all IM-based models for social advertising: they are not applicable to this new setting. The reason for this is as follows: IM-based models try to find a subset of seeders with the highest coverage given the seeding price of each seeder. In the IM-based model, a potential seeder node might not be chosen to act as a seeder for an ad if the price is too high compared to the additional reach that this seeder can offer. Instead of trying to find a subset of all available seeders to maximize spread for a given budget, we try to find prices such that under the budget constraints and value-per-engagement for a predefined set of available seeders-these are particular users willing to influence others for monetary compensation-can be allocated. Consequently, IM solves a problem which is orthogonal to the problem we propose in this paper: find revenue maximizing prices given (1) a set of available seeders, (2) values-per-engagement, and (3) budgets of advertisers.
Budget Constrained Auctions
To determine payments-per-engagement for the seeders, the social network platform needs to elicit the value-per-engagement of each advertiser. For this, auction mechanisms can be used to collect bids from each advertiser indicating their willingness to pay. In our specific setting, a bid consists of two pieces of information: the value-per-engagement and the budget. As discussed in Section 3.1, the value-per-engagement indicates how much an advertiser is maximally willing to pay for each engagement. In contrast, the budget restricts the overall payment of an advertiser.
It is important to note that the budget in our auction constrains the total amount of money paid by an advertiser within a single round of the auction. This contrasts with other advertising auctions, like sponsored search auctions, where the budget constraint applies to multiple rounds of auctions. In the latter case, in every auction round only the value-per-click of an advertiser is considered, not the budget. The reason for this is that in sponsored search auctions, every single auction round only sells a limited number of clicks (often only a single one) and hence, the total payment for each auction round is not very high for an advertiser. In our setting, a single auction round sells potentially a lot of engagements to an advertiser and hence, a single auction round can already deplete an advertiser's budget. Therefore, the budget of an advertiser must be included into the advertiser's bid. This difference sets our setting apart from other budget constrained auction models for advertising.
Truthfulness and Revenue
The auction for social advertising is deployed by the social network platform and hence, the objective is to maximize its revenue. Given the advertisers' bids, an auction can decide how much to charge the different advertisers per engagement. Unfortunately, one cannot just assume that the advertisers will reveal their true value-per-engagement and budget to the auction, if this information is eventually used to determine the payments. Indeed, in many auction settings, participants have an incentive to under-report their values to reduce the expected payment derived by the auction. However, when the auction mechanism is truthful, it incentivizes its participants to reveal their true value-in our specific setting the value-per-engagement-and true budget to the auction mechanism.
Non-truthful auctions (e.g., GSP and VCG with budget constraints), on the other hand, do not incentivize the participants to reveal their true value and budget. As [19] showed empirically on their deployed system, the revenue in sponsored search auctions could have been 60% higher if the auctions were truthful and thus, preventing certain cycling patterns in the bidding behavior of the participants. This gives us a strong motivation to design truthful auctions in our settings. However, focusing on truthful actions makes a direct comparison between truthful and non-truthful auctions not very meaningful, as one would first have to establish how the participants would strategically behave in a non-truthful auction for social advertising, i.e., finding an equilibrium state. Finding such equilibria for non-truthful auction is a research topic on its own and is out of the scope of this paper. To the best of our knowledge, only the multi-unit auction in [10] is a direct competitor for our work and hence, serves as a baseline throughout the paper.
MODEL
In this section, we introduce the model used in this paper.
Advertisers
Advertisers are the buyers in this auction, which means that they pay to receive user engagements from the social network. We denote with A the set of all advertisers. Each advertiser a ∈ A has a value-per-engagement v a which denotes how much the advertiser is willing to pay for each user engaging with the advertiser's ad. The value-per-engagement defines an advertiser's participation constraint: ∀a ∈ A : π a ≤ v a , where π a denotes the payment-perengagement. We will denote with Π a the total payment, that is, the payment-per-engagement π a times the number of engagements. Similar, we define the value V a as the value-per-engagement v a times the number of engagements. We assume that each advertiser in our model has exactly one ad to promote a certain product. To simplify the notation, we will use the same set A to describe the advertisers and the respective ads. Each advertiser a ∈ A is interested in maximizing the difference between the value V a and the payment Π a . We call this difference the utility U a of advertiser a ∈ A:
To engage with our auction platform, each advertiser has to report to the auction the value-per-engagementṽ a . Note thatṽ a can but doesn't have to be equal to v a . While v a is a private information of each advertiser,ṽ a is the public information reported to the auction platform. In addition to the value-per-engagement, each advertiser a ∈ A has a budget b a . The budget acts as a cap on the total amount of money the advertiser is willing to spend. We consider the budget constraint as a hard constraint, i.e., an advertiser has a value of −∞ for any payment that exceeds the budget constraint b a . Again, the budget constraint is a private information for each advertiser. We denote withb a the reported budget constraint which is public to the auctioneer. The reported valueṽ a and the reported budgetb a together form an advertiser's bid. Note that not all auction mechanism incentivizes its participants to setṽ a = v a and b a = b a . Indeed, an advertiser will report whatever valueṽ a and budgetb a will maximize its utility. A truthful auction mechanism is one which incentivizes its participants to reportṽ a = v a and b a = b a .
Each ad also has a topic distribution. The topic distribution describes the type of the ad. For this, we adopt the Topic-aware Independent Cascade (TIC) model [8] . In this model, each ad a ∈ A has a topic distribution τ a ∈ R |T | [0,1] over a latent topic space T . For a topic t ∈ T , we denote with τ t a ∈ R [0,1] the individual components of τ a . In the TIC model, each topic distribution τ a is a probability distribution. We also want to acknowledge the fact that different factors (e.g., quality of the ad, reputation of the associated brand, timeliness of the ad) can result in different reach for two different ads with the same topic distribution assigned to the same seeder. For this, we introduce a damping factor d a ∈ R [0,1] for each advertiser a ∈ A, which works like ad-specific and position-independent weights in sponsored search auctions [1, 30] . We will describe below how this damping factor is used.
Social network platform and seeders
The social network platform is the owner of the social network and the auction platform. The social network is a directed graph G(V , E, P) with a vertex-set V , an edge-set E, and function P which assigns to each edge e ∈ E and each topic t ∈ T a probability p t e . The goal of the social network platform is to maximize revenue, which is the sum of all incoming payments from the advertisers. For this, the auction has to decide which ad a ∈ A should be assigned to which seeder s ∈ S ⊂ V , where S denotes the set of all available seeders. Seeders are particular users which initialize the spread of the ads over the network. We call an assignment of ads to seeders an allocation, denoted as Z = (Z a 1 , . . . , Z a n ), where Z a indicates the set of seeders assigned to advertiser a ∈ A. Note that ∀a i a j : Z a i ∩ Z a j = ∅. The auctioneer also has to determine the payment-per-engagement π a for each advertiser a ∈ A.
After the auction closes and the allocation and prices are determined, the seeders start spreading their assigned advertisements. While the advertisement is propagating through the network, users in the social network have the chance to engage with the advertisement. Whenever this happens, the advertiser is charged the respective payment-per-engagement π a and the seeder who spread the ad will receive this payment-per-engagement. For this, each ad in the social network which originated from a specific seeder s must have its own signature such that the social network platform can identify the correct seeder whenever an engagement happens. The seeders have to trust the social network platform to truthfully keep track of the resulting engagements of each seeder.
Note that in our model, the social network platform is not making any profit but redirects the generated revenue to the seeders. In practice, a social network platform would keep a fraction of the generated revenue for themselves. In both cases, the goal of the social network platform is to maximize revenue and hence, for simplicity, we do not discuss the sharing of the revenue between seeders and the social network platform.
Seeders are nodes which can be used to spread ads over the social network. The set of available seeders S ⊂ V is predefined by the social advertising platform. If an ad is assigned to a seeder, the seeder will engage with the ad and try to influence its neighboring nodes within the network G. Each successfully influenced node will also engage with the ad. In addition, each successfully influenced node will in turn try to influence its neighbor nodes to create additional engagements with the ad. This means that the ad will propagate through the network and can potentially create a large amount of engagements. The advertiser will pay the auction the assigned payment-per-engagement π a for each engagement with the ad. According to the TIC model [8] , the probability p e=(u,v),a that a node u successfully influences a neighboring node v with ad a is dependent on the topic distribution of a and the edge probabilities of (u, v) ∈ E. Given a damping factor d a , the probability p e=(u,v),a Technical Presentation WSDM '20, February 3-7, 2020, Houston, TX, USA that an ad propagates via edge e from u to v is:
In our model, each node has exactly one chance of influencing a node in the network which has not yet been influenced by any other node. This means no node can be affected by two different ads. The influence process for an influenced user u happens as follows:
(1) The user u engages with the ad. (2) For each neighbor v which has not yet been influenced, with a probability p e=(u,v),a user u will redistribute ad a to user v and user v will be influenced by u.
(3) For each influenced user v, another influence process is started.
To maximize revenue, the auction has to know how many engagements an ad assigned to a certain seeder will yield. As this is a probabilistic process, the exact number of engagements can only be known after the ads have been spread through the social network. Hence, the auction has to obtain an estimate of the number of engagements (e.g., see [6, 24, 27, 45] ).
Let a ∈ A be an ad and Z an allocation. We denote with x a (Z ) the number of engagements produced by ad a under allocation Z . We will denote with x a (s |Z ) the number of engagements in x a (Z ) which originated from a specific seeder s ∈ S. Hence, we have:
Note that if an ad a ∈ A is not assigned to a specific seeder s ∈ S then x a (s |Z ) = 0. Since x a (s |Z ) is only known after the allocation, the auction mechanism has to rely on some estimates to determine the best allocation Z . We denote with σ a (Z ) the expected number of engagements for a under allocation Z .
Since the exact number of engagements for an ad a ∈ A is unknown when the auction platform creates an allocation, the total payment for an advertiser under this allocation is also unknown. However, since the auctioneer must respect the advertiser's budget constraint, the total payment from advertiser a cannot exceed the reported budgetb a . Hence, given an ad a ∈ A, a budgetb a , a price π a , and an allocation Z , the total payment Π a under Z is:
TRUTHFUL AUCTION MECHANISMS
In this section, we will introduce truthful auction mechanisms for the social advertising setting.
Borgs: the Baseline Mechanism
This baseline is an adaptation of a randomized truthful mechanism based on the multi-unit auction proposed by Borgs et al. [10] . Throughout the rest of this paper, we will refer to this auction mechanism as Borgs.
To provide a truthful mechanism, the multi-unit auction in [10] divides all bidders randomly into two groups, A and B, of approximately same size, and calculates the per-unit price for one group based on the bids of the other group. Without loss of generality, let us assume that all advertisers a ∈ A are sorted in decreasing order of their reported valueṽ a and have consecutive indices a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a | A | . To find the price π A , Borgs [10] solves the following equation to find i ⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , |A|} and then sets π A =ṽ a i ⋆ :
where Z | a j denotes the allocation where all seeders s ∈ S are allocated to the same advertiser a j . The price π B derived from group B (and applied to A) is calculated similarly. Calculating the price based on the bids of one group and applying it to the other group is needed to make the mechanism truthful. Using this technique, an advertiser a cannot influence its own price π a by changing its bidṽ a .
Based on the prices π A and π B we can now do the allocation. For this, we assign the seeders in S randomly to those advertisers who have a reported value-per-engagement of at least π A and π B , for advertisers in B and A, respectively, and enough budget left to afford the respective seeder. Recall that π A is the price which is derived from group A and applied to group B during allocation.
Note that Borgs assumes goods are divisible using a specific randomization strategy, where a participant is charged a fraction of the price for a good and only receives it with a certain probability [10] . This strategy does not work when allocating seeders to advertisers, as being allocated is a necessary requirement for an advertisement to being charged. Thus, the payment-per-engagement Borgs finds is not optimal for group A and B.
We will prove the truthfulness of Borgs in Section 5.3 in this new setting. In the following, we discuss our mechanism which is specifically designed for the social advertising setting.
TSA: an Extension for Social Advertising
To deal with the shortcomings of Borgs, we introduce our own mechanism, Truthful Social Advertising (TSA), which extends the basic idea of Borgs. TSA uses a random split technique just like Borgs. However, determining the best payment as well as allocating seeders is done differently, which makes a crucial difference for the performance of TSA.
One big drawback of Borgs is that it only considers the valueper-engagement when determining the prices and the allocation. The mechanism ignores the fact that different advertisers might yield different numbers of engagements for the same set of seeders. This can lead to a huge revenue loss if the highest bidders are yielding considerably less engagements than their lower bidding competitors. Hence, TSA does the pricing and allocation not just based on the bids but based on the product of placed bid and the expected number of engagements. In TSA, we again split all the advertisers randomly into two groups, A and B.
Given an advertiser a ∈ A and the corresponding weight ζ a ∈ R + , the payment-per-engagement is defined as
where Z | a is the allocation which assigns all seeders in S to the same advertiser a. Next, we will discuss how the weight ζ a is determined.
To find a good ζ a , TSA iterates through each advertiser a ∈ A and sets ζ a =ṽ a · σ a (Z | a ). 1 Then, TSA simulates an allocation to get the expected revenue when deriving payments-per-engagement based on ζ a . To account for the fact that only half of all advertisers is in group A, we create a copy of each advertiser in A with the same value-per-engagement and budget, which we denote with A ′ . Then, we use the set A ∪ A ′ to estimate the revenue for A ∪ B. The simulated allocation itself is done by solving an Integer Programming problem. The objective is to maximize the sum of all incoming payments from all advertisers. The constraints are that (1) a seeder can only be assigned to one advertiser, (2) an advertiser's payment cannot exceed its reported budget, and (3) the payment-per-engagement cannot exceed the respective reported value-per-engagement. Once we have simulated an allocation for all ζ a for all a ∈ A, we can do the actual allocation. For this, we define the revenue maximizing value of A, denoted as ζ A , as ζ A := ζ a i ⋆ , and use this value to calculate the prices. Here, ζ a i ⋆ is the value which yields the highest revenue under the simulated allocations for A ∪ A ′ . For each advertiser a ∈ B, we derive the payment-perengagement according to Equation (5) by setting ζ a = ζ A . That is, the payment-per-engagement for an advertiser in group B is determined by the revenue maximizing value ζ A for advertisers in A. In the same way, we can calculate ζ B to get a payment-perengagement π a for each advertiser a ∈ A.
Proof of Truthfulness
In this section, we will prove that Borgs and TSA are truthful in the social advertising setting. Assumption 1. The expected number of engagements σ a (Z ) under allocation Z for an advertiser a ∈ A and a seeder s ∈ S equals the actual number of engagements x a (Z ), in expectation.
As it turns out, the mechanisms are truthful as long as Assumption 1 holds. Further, the mechanisms are only truthful in expectation [18, 31, 41] . This means that the expected utility of an advertiser is maximized when the advertiser setsṽ a = v a andb a = b a .
Before we prove truthfulness, we introduce the following lemma:
and (v a ,b a ) be two bids from the same advertiser a withb a ≤ b a . Let X E a andX E a be the expected number of engagements under bid (v a , b a ) and (v a ,b a ), respectively. Theñ X a ≤ X a for Borgs and TSA.
Proof. We prove the lemma for both mechanisms. Mechanism 1: Borgs. Under Borgs, seeders are assigned randomly as long as the expected payment does not exceed the budget. Let p a (s |(v a , b a )) denote the probability that a seeder s ∈ S is allocated to a given the bid
TSA solves an Integer Program for the allocation. Note that any feasible solution under bid (v a ,b a ) is also feasible under bid (v a , b a ), as the latter is less constraining. Let Z 1 be an allocation which is feasible under (v a , b a ) but not under (v a ,b a ), then Ex a (Z 1 ) · π a > a ≤ Ex a (Z 2 ) · π a for any feasible allocation Z 2 . Hence, Ex a (Z 1 ) > Ex a (Z 2 ). Therefore,X E a ≤ X E a . □
We next present our main result. Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, Borgs and TSA are truthful in expectation.
Proof. Let (ṽ a ,b a ) be the bid of advertiser a, let furtherŨ E a and X E a be the expected utility and expected number of engagements, respectively, under this bid. Let π a be the assigned price. Finally, let U E a and X E a be the expected utility and expected number of engagements, respectively, when bidding (v a , b a ). We need to show thatŨ E a ≤ U E a in all possible cases. Part 1: The budgetb a is arbitrary but fixed. v a <ṽ a andṽ a < π a :S a = ∅ ⇒Ũ E a = 0 ≤ U E a . v a <ṽ a and v a < π a ≤ṽ a :
The valueṽ a is arbitrary but fixed. Note that due to budget constraintX E a · π a ≤b a . b a <b a and b a <X E a · π a : Hard budget constraint violated ⇒
Upper Bound on Revenue Loss
Could we lose revenue as a result of enforcing truthfulness? In the following, we will establish an upper bound on the loss of revenue of TSA. Recall that TSA uses revenue maximizing values ζ A and ζ B to be applied to the respective other group. We compare the revenue generated under this mechanism with its non-truthful counterpart, NTSA, which applies the revenue maximizing values to the same group. The expression r A + r B denotes the total revenue which is generated under NTSA. W.l.o.g., assume that ζ A ≥ ζ B . In the worst case, none of the advertisers in B can afford the higher price under ζ A . In this case, none of the revenue r B can be preserved under the truthful mechanism. On the other hand, all advertisers in A can afford the lower price under ζ B . Recall that TSA solves an Integer Program for the allocation. The optimal allocation Z under ζ A is a feasible allocation under ζ B , as the higher ζ A is more constraining (less advertisers can afford the prices) than ζ B . Therefore, the optimal revenue under Z when using ζ A serves as a lower bound for the optimal revenue using ζ B . Hence, the loss in revenue is at most
σ a (Z ) per engagement of advertiser a and hence, the upper bound for the relative loss of revenue is
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have examined our approaches experimentally. Section 6.1 describes the setup, and Section 6.2 describes the results.
Setup
We focus on the two truthful auction mechanisms, namely TSA and Borgs, as described in Section 5, and NTSA, as described in Section 5.4. We examined several real and synthetic datasets: Real datasets. The Flixster 2 is a directed graph from a social website for movie ratings 3 containing 2.5M nodes and 9M edges. The DIGG 4 is a directed graph from a social website for story ratings 5 containing 770K nodes and 7M edges. In both datasets, a directed edge (u, v) can be interpreted as a node u having influence on node v with a certain probability [8] .
For each dataset, we chose two different sets of 50 nodes which act as seeders in our experiments. The first set of seeders, which we call the top-50 seeders, consist of the 50 nodes with the highest out-degree. The second set of seeders, called the random seeders, consists of 50 randomly chosen nodes. For the two datasets, we used the probability distributions found by [8] to model the probability that a node influences its neighbors. Afterwards, we ran 10 Monte-Carlo simulations for each advertiser and each seeder to get an estimation of the expected number of clicks. We ran the simulations in isolation, that is, we measured how many other nodes a seeder could reach if not being in competition with other seeders.
We chose 10 different topics for the TIC model for Flixster and 20 different topics for the TIC model for DIGG, which is the recommended number of topics for these datasets [8] . We created two different sets, each having 100 advertisers. In the first set of advertisers, each advertiser has one ad with a random topic distribution among the 10 and 20 topics, respectively, and a damping factor of d = 1. In the second set, each advertiser has a damping factor d which was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. For the value-per-engagement, we chose randomly a value uniformly distributed between $0.50 and $2.00, which is close to the different country-wise averages spent per click on Facebook in 2017 [23] . For the Flixster dataset, we set the budget of each advertiser to $5000 to make sure that the advertiser with the highest possible value ($2.00) can afford the seeder with the largest spread (around 2200). Likewise, we set the budget to $1000 for the DIGG dataset (the largest spread is around 450). With the two different set of seeders (top-50 seeders and random seeders) and two set of advertisers (with and without damping factor), we have a total of four different settings. We denote the two settings without damping factor as top-50 and random, and the two settings with damping factor as top-50 damp. and random damp., respectively.
Synthetic datasets. The number of seeders is kept fixed at 50. The number of advertisers ranges between 10 and 1000. The valueper-engagement is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for each advertiser, if not stated otherwise. In addition, each advertiser has a budget of $5000. In the first setting, which we denote as synth. random, the influence is randomly chosen for each pair of advertiser and seeder from a uniform distribution between 0 and 2000. In the next setting, denoted as synth. diverse, the influence σ a (s) for a pair of advertisers a ∈ A and seeder s ∈ S is composed of two different random numbers, both drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, multiplied by 2000. The first of the two random number r a,s is different for each pair of advertiser and seeder. The second random number r a , however, is shared among all seeders for a specific advertiser a. The result is a bigger diversity for the total influence for all seeders among different advertisers, as some advertisers have a low influence across all seeders whereas others have higher influence. In the final setting, denoted as synth. inverted, the influence is chosen in a way such that an advertiser's value for a seeder is negatively correlated with its value-per-engagement. This scenario represents settings where low-bidding advertisers have a higher value, due to a much larger reach, than high-bidding advertisers. For example, advertisers selling every-day items with a low value-per-engagement versus advertisers selling luxury items with a high value-per-engagement. In this setting, for n ∈ N advertisers a 1 , . . . , a n we set the valueper-engagement for advertiser a i to i/n. The influence x a i (s) for any seeder s ∈ S for a specific advertiser a i is set as:
Environments. We performed our experiments on a PC with an i5-8250U 4-core CPU and 16GB of RAM. For software, we used Python 3.7.0. To implement TSA, we used the state-of-the-art solver Gurobi 8.1.0 6 to approximate an optimal allocation with a lower bound of at least 95%. The code and data used for evaluation can be found at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3484190. Figure 3 show the revenue achieved by Borgs, TSA, and NTSA. Note that the revenue for NTSA is only hypothetical, as it is working under the assumption that bidders are bidding truthful, although they are not incentivized to do so. However, NTSA allows us to study how much revenue we sacrifice to establish truthfulness in TSA. All values in the figures are the result of 100 iterations with the same set of seeders and advertisers. In each iteration, the two groups A and B are randomly selected.
Results
When comparing the revenue across the different settings in Figure 1 and Figure 3 , one can observe that TSA outperforms Borgs, consistently. The advantage of TSA becomes more pronounced in the settings with a dampening factor (top-50 damp. and random damp.). The reason for this is that when using a dampening factor, advertisers with a high value-per-engagement might yield a lower revenue than advertisers with a lower value-per-engagement but much higher influence per seeder. Consequently, Borgs might allocate the wrong advertisers resulting in a low revenue. TSA does not suffer from the same problem, as the actual revenue achieved by the different advertisers is considered during allocation. Last, we can see that in the DIGG dataset, the random settings have a very low revenue compared to the top settings. This suggests that while there are some very influential nodes in the DIGG dataset, compared to this, the average node is not very influential. The difference between the two mechanisms is the largest for the inverted setting. This can be explained because the advertisers with the highest value-per-engagement are the ones with the lowest value for the different seeders and hence, with the lowest potential for generating revenue for the auctioneer. Therefore, Borgs favor exactly the wrong advertisers for the allocation. Figure 4 shows the scaling behavior of the different methods. We used the synth. random setting here; other synthetic settings have similar values for the average runtime. The plot shows that Borgs has a much more favorable runtime behavior than TSA. The time complexity of Borgs is O(n log(n)), where n is the number of advertisers. This comes from the fact the mechanisms must sort all advertisers and then scan through the list. TSA must approximate optimal solutions for O(n) Integer Programming problems, which results in a higher runtime footprint.
From these experiments, we can see that TSA performs better than Borgs in terms of revenue, while Borgs has better scalability.
When comparing TSA with NTSA, we can see that the revenue of NTSA is only slightly larger. Indeed, the average loss in revenue for the Flixster and DIGG datasets is around 7%-8%. We also measured the average revenue loss for the synthetic random scenario for different number of advertisers. As Table 1 shows, the revenue becomes smaller when the number of advertisers is increased. This is due to the fact that the value-per-engagement distribution between the two groups, A and B, will be more similar when the number of advertisers is increased. Remarkably, with 1000 advertisers, the loss in revenue to ensure truthfulness is less than 2%. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study auctions for social advertising in the presence of budget constraints, values-per-engagement, and paymentsper-engagement. When the auction underlying the social advertising model is not truthful, we cannot be certain about the amount of revenue achieved by an allocation since there is scope for strategic bidding by the advertisers. We thus develop an auction mechanism for social advertising called TSA and establish that it is truthful (in expectation). Remarkably, TSA only sacrifices a few percentages of revenue compared to its non-truthful counterpart, NTSA. Our experimental evaluation shows that TSA significantly outperforms the baseline Borgs in all settings. An interesting question for future work is how to derive approximation algorithms which have a more favorable runtime like Borgs but have a performance (expected revenue) similar to TSA.
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